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Abstract—In many domains, software systems cannot be deployed until authorities judge them fit for use in an intended operating
environment. Certification standards and processes have been devised and deployed to regulate operations of software systems and
prevent their failures. However, practitioners are often unsatisfied with the efficiency and value proposition of certification efforts. In this
study, we compare two certification standards, Common Criteria and DO-178C, and collect insights from literature and from interviews
with subject-matter experts to identify design options relevant to the design of standards. The results of the comparison of certification
efforts—leading to the identification of design dimensions that affect their quality—serve as a framework to guide the comparison,
creation, and revision of certification standards and processes. This paper puts software engineering research in context and discusses
key issues around process and quality assurance and includes observations from industry about relevant topics such as recertification,
timely evaluations, but also technical discussions around model-driven approaches and formal methods. Our initial characterization of the
design space of certification efforts can be used to inform technical discussions and to influence the directions of new or existing
certification efforts. Practitioners, technical commissions, and government can directly benefit from our analytical framework.
Index Terms—software certification, certification standards design, interviews, grounded analysis
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1 INTRODUCTION
Software certification by regulatory entities plays a funda-
mental role in defining and assessing the fitness of software
systems in environments where failures can result in serious
consequences. Software flaws can negatively affect business,
environment, and society, for example, when confidential
data are leaked or when medical devices emit excessive
radiation [1], [2], [3].
Airborne and power plant systems have a long regulatory
history, and their requirements and development processes
are better understood than those from emerging domains
such as software-based medical devices, IoT ecosystems, or
self-driving cars. New guidelines are being discussed to
address the challenges posed by these domains, but these
are still incipient initiatives. There is much discussion but
little agreement on how these domains should be regulated.
There are many competing drivers for regulating a domain,
defining standards, and establishing certification processes
for software systems. For example, different stakeholders
expect certification processes to:
• enhance the quality of products,
• specify software processes to guide development of
products,
• guide requirements definition for certified products and
define a common vocabulary among practitioners, and
• serve as a legal safe harbor.
At the same time, current certification schemes are often
criticized for creating perverse incentives [4], [5], [6], [7].
For example, Common Criteria allows vendors to select
testing laboratories; vendors may then select laboratories
that give “easy” evaluations, by charging less, being less
thorough, or taking less time; contradicting the “enhance
the quality of software products” goal of the certification
efforts [4]. The value proposition of certification is also
questioned. For example, even experts claim that “belief in
the effectiveness of DO-178C and similar standards is superstition,
not science or engineering” [6]. As a consequence, certification
is sometimes seen as just a “tick the box” process and as an
obstacle for selling products [5]. In cases where vendors are
satisfied with the value proposition of certification efforts,
there are still efficiency and scalability issues. For example,
the long development cycles and certification time observed
in the aerospace industry might be incompatible with the
automobile industry’s expectations [8].
Another common criticism of current certification ap-
proaches is that certification methods can be subjective and
do not make use of the most powerful or cost-effective quality
assurance methods to produce or evaluate evidence. In our
study, we use evidence to refer to any artifact that is produced
for quality-evaluation purposes. Software certification often
focuses on evidence derived from documenting and manu-
ally analyzing requirements, development processes, and test
protocols. Advances in software engineering techniques, for
example, testing, theorem proving, and static analysis, which
could mechanize evidence production and provide more
guarantees, are only slowly adopted, if at all. Many argue
that the next generation of certification standards must focus
on making the use of such techniques ubiquitous to reduce
subjective interpretation and increase objective production
of evidence [9], [10], [11].
Despite all the tension around existing and upcoming
certification standards, there is little public knowledge about
what aspects of designing certification efforts are important
or controversial. Domain experts are often familiar with a
single standard and its evolution and many have published
white papers and magazine articles [12], [5], [13], [6], [10],
[14], [15], often calling for change to a specific standard.
However, domain experts have their own agenda and might
not be aware of alternatives adopted in other domains or
have a limited view of the conflicting forces at play.
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2Our goal is to step back and to compare two certification
efforts based on the analysis of standard documents and
on the perceptions of stakeholders involved with them
in their everyday activities. Specifically, we performed a
multiple case study [16] based on two certification stan-
dards: Common Criteria, which assesses security requirements
of infrastructure and end-user software and devices, and
DO-178C, which assesses safety requirements in software
aerospace systems. We specifically chose standards from two
distinct communities to elicit alternatives adopted by them
and to increase stakeholders awareness of the conflicting
forces at play on each community.
For this purpose, we cross-validated data from three
sources: (i) interviews with 18 experts working with these
standards in various roles, (ii) analysis of standards’ doc-
uments, and (iii) a survey of 11 papers discussing these
standards (often white papers and magazine articles).
Our results contribute to an analytical framework grounded
in data that can support the creation and revision of
certification efforts. The framework elicits relevant design
dimensions, their range of options, and the interactions that
arise between options and the quality of certification efforts.
We also characterize each standard in the framework as we
identify their alternatives in the design dimensions, but also
highlight points of contention, trends, and open questions
for designers of future certification efforts. Our results are
intended to better-inform decisions about software processes,
techniques, and tools that affect certification efforts design.
Our paper does not intend to present or evaluate solutions
for the design of certification standards (the evaluation on a
new standard might be a 10-year agenda beyond the scope of
a single paper), but it encourages further investigation and
ground discussions with data from two important cases [31,
ch. 13], which is a substantial step toward a testable theory
and valuable in itself for the community.
In summary, we contribute (1) insights from interviews
with 18 experts and cross-validated with analysis of the stan-
dards’ documents and a literature survey, (2) an analytical
framework with design dimensions and interactions between
them for creating and assessing certification efforts, (3) an
analysis of two standards in the context of the framework;
including design options collected from 18 interviews as
well as from 13 papers written by subject-matter experts,
and (4) discussion of challenges in certification efforts and
implications for future standards.
2 CERTIFYING SOFTWARE SYSTEMS
Certification standards define the technical baseline for
vendors to produce compliant products that demonstrate
a set of desired quality attributes and for evaluators to
judge their compliance to these attributes. In this context,
software represents both the means and end of certification.
Many certification efforts exist for various kinds of properties.
Common Criteria [17], DO-178C [18], IEC 62304 [19], and
NIST RMF 800 Series [20], for example, play a leading role
in the certification of infrastructure and application software
systems, airborne systems, medical device software, and
information security controls for systems and organizations,
respectively. They differ in formality, adoption, and certifica-
tion processes, with focus ranging from product requirements
to life cycle development and maintenance requirements to
organizational requirements.
Early certification standards with focus on product re-
quirements optimistically expected that mathematical models
and system design elements could enable the development
of systems that were virtually free of safety or security viola-
tions [6], [21]. Certification standards in the safety community
were inspired by hardware standards, often associating
statistical failure rates with assurance levels to address the
criticality of products. In contrast, certification standards
in the security community were originally motivated by
the proliferation of time-sharing computing, which replaced
batch processing as a paradigm and defined multilevel
computer security as field [21], [22]. Today it is broadly
accepted that it is unlikely to achieve the probability of
failures level and the “vulnerability-free” status to which
early certification efforts aspired [23], [6].
More recent certification standards relax the “high-
assurance” expectations of earlier ones. Instead of aspiring
to guarantee the correctness of a system, they provide the
means to analyze the design and implementation of functionality
by checking how particular requirements are met; that is, they
focus on specific requirements. For our study, we investigate
two current and broadly used standards, Common Criteria
and DO-178C, that follow this mindset.
2.1 Common Criteria
Common Criteria [17] is an international computer security
standard created to evaluate security attributes of products
against security specification and requirements. Systems
certified with Common Criteria are typically infrastructure
software, such as databases, operating systems, and firewalls,
as well as various software systems and devices for net-
working, trusted computing, digital signatures, smart cards,
and biometric systems. Common Criteria originated from
the U.S. TCSEC standard (Orange Book), released in 1982,
and was later unified with the European ITSEC standard
to provide mutual recognition mechanisms to products
addressing international markets [15], [24]. For Common
Criteria, security requirements such as information security
principles and access control are the main quality attributes
of concern. Functional testing, vulnerability analysis, and
secure development practices [25], [17] are the main proxies
for assessing security.
A certification in Common Criteria works as follows. A
document called a Security Target defines the scope of an
evaluation and describes a set of implementation-dependent
security requirements. To achieve consistent standards across
multiple products in one domain, Protection Profiles (PP) de-
scribe technology-specific and implementation-independent
security requirements for many domains, such as operat-
ing systems, databases, and VPN clients. For example, a
protection profile for Web Browsers specifies requirements
for secure cookie handling, deleting browser data, and
sandboxing the rendering process among many others [26].
The roles defined by certification with Common Criteria
are: (1) developers/vendors produce the required evidence
for a product evaluation, including the Security Target,
(2) evaluators/testing laboratories are private companies
that evaluate products in accordance with the policies
3defined by a certification scheme, and (3) meta-evaluators
are responsible for the oversight of testing laboratories and
to ensure consistency among them.
A typical evaluation process in Common Criteria works
as follows: (1) the vendor identifies what evidence needs
to be produced for a given set of security requirements,
(2) the vendor produces a Security Target, the evidence that
the product meets it, and submits both to a testing laboratory,
(3) a testing laboratory then checks the compliance between
the two and performs independent testing and vulnerability
analysis of the product.
The standard defines seven levels of assurance for se-
curity requirements (EAL-1 to EAL-7), which require in-
creasingly detailed documentation and assessment methods.
For example, demonstrating that the implementation of a
system corresponds to its design, as the ADV_TDS assurance
family specifies, can range from informal design description
(EAL-2) to formal specification (EAL-7). Protection Profiles
created in Europe specify assurance levels [17] in their
description that can be selected for evaluations according to
customers need. However, Protection Profiles defined in the
United States do not allow the selection of assurance levels
and accurately specify the minimal set of requirements and
assurance for a technology. Recently, evaluations conducted
in the United States are accepted only if a product claims
strict conformance with an approved Protection Profile [27].
2.2 DO-178C
DO-178C [18] is a commercial standard used to regulate the
development and certification of software-based aerospace
systems. It is currently used to evaluate airborne software
systems by aviation authorities around the world. The
standard is not freely available; so we joined the Radio
Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) to gain access.
DO-178C is a 2011 replacement of DO-178B (introduced in
1992). For DO-178C, general safety, reliability and predictability
are the key quality attributes of concern. As a proxy for these
qualities, traceability between requirements and source code
and deterministic resource consumption are evaluated.
The roles defined by certification with DO-178C are:
(1) developers/vendors are usually aerospace manufacturers
and suppliers; they produce the required evidence for
product evaluation, (2) evaluators/designated engineering
representatives (DERs) are private companies or public
agencies accredited by aviation certification authorities;
they evaluate products in accordance to the standard
throughout four stages of development [28], and (3) meta-
evaluators/certification authorities oversee designated engi-
neering representatives and their processes. For uniformity,
from now on we refer to “designated engineering represen-
tatives” as “testing laboratories.”
A typical evaluation process in DO-178C is similar to
one in Common Criteria—vendors generate evidence and
evaluators check the evidence to qualify the associated
system. A difference is that DO-178C defines five levels
of assurance determined by safety assessment processes,
from A to E with decreasing degree of criticality. These
levels reflect the maximum severity of failure in the software
under evaluation and, consequently, the thoroughness of the
evaluation process, as measured by the number of objectives
met and the degree of independence required between
development and assurance team to verify the objectives.
For example, passenger entertainment and internet com-
munications subsystems, being instances of low-criticality
systems, are evaluated according to level E objectives.
3 RESEARCH DESIGN
This study builds on the experience of the authors in engag-
ing with diverse stakeholders from government and industry
who are concerned with the development of confident assur-
ance judgments. Initial discussions with stakeholders, often
based in opinions rather than facts, motivated our grounded
research approach based on interview data, literature survey,
and certification standards document analysis.
We contrast two distinct software certification standards
aiming at characterizing the design space [29], [31], [30] of
certification efforts. Rather than generating a complete and
bounded set of independent design options for designing
certification efforts, we aim at start eliciting relevant design
dimensions across two existing cases, namely Common
Criteria and DO-178C. The characterization of a design space
for certification efforts provides an analytical framework that
can be used to inform technical discussions towards revising
or designing new standards. Design space representations
have long been used to codify knowledge about families of
designs [30], [69], [70], [71], [72], [73].
Our investigation focuses on the comparison of two
certification standard cases, namely Common Criteria and
DO-178C, and is centered around two research questions:
• RQ1: What are the design dimensions for certification
efforts?
• RQ2: How do design dimensions affect the quality of
certification efforts?
To answer these two questions and to understand how
design dimensions affect the efficiency and effectiveness of
certification efforts, we combine qualitative interviews of do-
main experts with iterative data analysis. We use this method
because it allows us to combine in-depth open-ended inquiry
with focused data analysis. This allows insights to emerge
iteratively and enables us to have more control over the data
being constructed in the study than other methods [32]. A
survey, for example, cannot provide the same opportunities
for reflection and would require an upfront theory [33]. We
follow standard methods of qualitative research that grounds
results and discussion in data, but do not claim to follow any
grounded theory model because we start our study with a
preconceived set of comparison criteria.
Our paper aims at contrasting two communi-
ties/standards and at presenting cross-case insights. We
gather opinions from practitioners in different roles, organiza-
tions, and countries, aiming to include diverse backgrounds
and experiences. We look beyond a single standard to
understand the broader context, aiming to achieve theoretical
replication [16]. As characterized by Yin, the goal with
theoretical replication is to study important cases that can
contribute to analytic generalization and provide significant
insights for further research rather than achieve statistical
generalization. Instead of discussing each case individually,
we aim at examining differences in processes and outcomes
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Fig. 1. Overview of our research method: from the initial standard
document analysis, to interviews and literature survey, to the final design
dimensions and qualities.
of certification efforts across communities and at presenting
cross-case insights and conclusions about their design.
In the rest of this section, we provide a more detailed
description of: (1) our research method based on interviews
and content analysis, (2) our participant recruitment strategy,
(3) our paper selection process for the literature survey, and
(4) threats to validity.
3.1 Research Method
As is common in qualitative exploratory research, we pro-
ceeded in multiple iterations. We started conceptualizing our
prior understanding from informal discussions about soft-
ware certification into a list of criteria for further study. Next,
we studied the documents of both certification standards and
performed a literature survey on both standards, applying
and refining the list of criteria (see Appendix ??). We then
used these criteria to derive initial interview questions and
conducted interviews with 18 experts that worked with the
standards in different roles (see Appendix ??). We interleaved
coding and analysis of the interview transcripts with revising
our questions catalog. After concluding all interviews, we
again analyzed all documents to identify common themes
and coded all interview transcripts and papers. We describe
the specifics of each step next. Figure 1 shows an overview
of the followed research method.
First, we collected a set of criteria that could be used to
guide our comparison of certification efforts (see Table 1).
These criteria represent potential points of discussion about
certification efforts and were based on our experience and
on prior discussions with stakeholders in the field. It was
the very motivation of this study to confront ours and their
beliefs and preconceptions [34], approaching observations
around certification efforts more scientifically by grounding
them on data . Our initial set of criteria was:
Second, we analyzed the latest editions of the Common
Criteria and DO-178C standards (a total of over 1300 pages)
[17], [35], [18]. The process of reviewing the documents
involved understanding the standards and mapping relevant
parts from the documents to the criteria we initially identified
in our set. For example, regarding the “Reliability and
validity of certification results” criteria, we identified that
the language used by Common Criteria [17] to define how
evaluators should assess products design leaves much room
for interpretation: “The evaluator shall determine that the design
is an accurate and complete instantiation of all security functional
requirements.” This specific example motivated us to ask
questions about practices around inter-rater reliability during
our interviews.
TABLE 1
Initial set of criteria used to design our study.
Quality attributes addressed; level of quality assurable.
Validity of certification results.
Reliability of evaluations and certification results.
Process phase where evaluation activities are undertaken.
Evaluator access to intellectual property and artifacts.
Role of architectural decisions and implementation choices.
Process indicators vs. examination of development artifacts.
Reusability of evidence from prior evaluations.
Diversity of kinds of evidence to support judgments.
Up-front investment and ongoing cost.
Benefits to cost, schedule, and risk management.
Enhancements to engineer productivity.
Composability of certification artifacts and results.
Support for certification of ecosystems (libraries, frameworks).
Skill requirements for developers and evaluators.
Third, we used the initial set of criteria and the technically-
informed analysis of standards’ documentation to guide the
design of our semi-structured interviews. We designed our
interview questions to allow differences around the criteria
between the two standards to emerge during the interviews.
During an interview, we start with an open question such as
‘How long does a typical certification process take?’ and proceed
from there based on the experiences of each interviewee.
We shared interview guides across standards, but designed
separate interview guides for developers and evaluators (see
Appendix ?? for examples of questions asked to evaluators).
We conducted interviews with 18 participants (see Section
3.3) experienced with the standards. We refined our interview
questions after each interview and more substantially after a
thorough data analysis conducted after nine interviews. We
aimed to identify topics that we had not covered in the inter-
views or for which we received evasive, vague, or conflicting
answers from participants. Interleaving interviews and data
analysis was essential to grounding the differences across
the two standards in practice.
Finally, in addition to interviews, we read and coded
white papers, experience reports, and opinion papers by
consultants and subject-matter experts (see Section 3.4 for
details). We used the surveyed papers as additional interview
data by extracting interesting comments, insights, and quotes
about issues with certification efforts that map back to our
initial set of criteria.
3.2 Data Analysis
Our data analysis was based on Qualitative Content Analysis
[36] and we used coding both as reductive and conceptual
device. That is, we use it to reduce our text-based data from
interview transcripts and from surveyed papers, but also to
draw connections between our data and the set of criteria
relevant for standard comparison. The goal was to build
a coding frame to structure data obtained from the cross-
validation of our set of criteria with interview transcripts
and surveyed papers. All interviews and papers were coded
by at least two authors and all new or conflicting codes that
emerged were discussed and merged when necessary.
To explain in more detail how we built the coding frame
obtained from the analysis of interviews’ and surveyed
papers’ raw data, we will use an example of the design
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Fig. 2. Example of code and categories obtained from iterative content
analysis of textual data, which includes interview transcripts and literature
papers (a) and a slice of the final coding structure after codes and
categories have been merged and organized hierarchically (b).
quality Reliability. To build our concept-driven coding
frame [36, p. 84], we first used our initial set of criteria
as code categories, as described in Table 1. The categories
from the initial coding frame were unstructured, directly
reflecting the set of individual criteria we identified during
the discussion phase. Next, we refined these categories
iteratively using the raw data we collected from the
standards documents, interview transcripts, and papers. We
constantly revised our coding frame while incorporating new
interview data to our analysis, generating new categories
and sub-categories, but also merging old ones. We eventually
applied a hierarchy to the coding frame to enable better
and deeper comparisons. For example, this allowed us to
classify the top-level categories of our coding frame into
design dimensions and qualities, which are the central
points of discussion in this paper. Figure 2(a) illustrates how
the raw data is abstracted to codes and (b) shows a slice of
the hierarchical coding structure showing Reliability as the
top-level category.
Raw data: “So, we really said, “How do we add value” How do
we gain assurance so that we can truly mutually recognize these
evaluation activities? And that’s when we decided that review
of source code was risky to vendors, was time-consuming
and expensive to evaluation facilities, and it really did not
give us the confidence that we needed because we had no
sense of consistency.”
Code: Subjectivity in source code evaluation;
Categories: Reliability, Access to Evidence.
From this code, which summarizes the snippet in bold font
extracted from the quote, we inferred that the discussion is
about reliability among evaluators (Reliability), but about
the use ofsource code, which relates to the kinds of evidence
available to evaluators and to how they are manipulated by
evaluators (Access to Evidence).
3.3 Participant Recruitment
We interviewed 18 experts with experience in either cer-
tification standard in different roles and from different
backgrounds (i.e., not all from the same organization). Given
the sensitive and political nature of the topic, recruiting
participants was significantly more challenging than in our
prior interview studies on software engineering topics, but
still within the range of what is considered acceptable in
high-quality research [37], [38, p. 189]. We reached out to
additional potential participants using public listings of
TABLE 2
Interviewees and their role in the certification process.
Codes Role Expertise
CC1, CC6, CC7 Developer CC
CC3, CC4, CC5, CC9, CC10 Evaluator CC
CC2 Meta-evaluator CC
CC8 Policymaker CC
DO1, DO3, DO4, DO6, DO8 Developer DO-178C
DO2, DO5 Evaluator DO-178C
DO7 Meta-evaluator DO-178C
TABLE 3
Surveyed papers that reflect on either social, technical, or
economic aspects of software certification.
Standard Citation
Common Criteria [5], [10], [12], [13], [24], [39], [40]
DO178C [6], [7], [14], [41], [42], [43]
testing laboratories, contacting companies with certified
products, contacting people mentioned in publicly available
reports, and used our professional connections to find
participants. We did only marginally rely on our professional
network to conduct the study (5 out of 18 participants).
As part of the recruiting e-mail, we explained the purpose
of the study, asked them about their experience with the
standards, and asked to schedule phone or Skype calls with
them. After agreeing to participate, we conducted interviews,
each lasting 30–40 minutes. With participants’ consent, all
interviews were recorded and later transcribed. Table 2
lists our participants, their roles in the certification process,
and standard expertise. Participants were from 14 different
organizations, from seven different countries.
3.4 Literature Survey
To complement our interviews, we conducted a literature
survey and selected white papers, experience reports, and
opinion papers that discuss practices, challenges, and solu-
tions to problems related to software certification. Our paper
selection is targeted, since we focus on papers that reflect
on either social, technical, or economic aspects of software
certification. In total, we selected 13 papers, seven papers
discussing Common Criteria and six papers discussing DO-
178C (see Table 3).
We searched the web (Google Scholar) and digital li-
braries (IEEE Xplore, ACM), using “Common Criteria” and
“DO-178C” as the main keywords and went through the
first 100 results and read each paper’s title and abstract,
discarding clearly out-of-scope items. That is, we intention-
ally surveyed papers that critically reflect on certification
standards and their processes and discarded many papers
that:
• only provide an overview (and explain the basics) of
each standard,
• only lists changes in certification processes overtime, or
• only discuss narrow technical aspects of a particular
standard.
Furthermore, we used snowball sampling to identify further
relevant papers from the reference list of papers as we read
6them and added two papers suggested by our interviewees.
The distinctiveness of the standards’ names reduces the risks
of missing important papers. After having downloaded each
selected paper, we transform them into text and analyze
them as interview transcripts.
3.5 Threats to Validity
Our study may suffer from threats to validity commonly
found in qualitative studies.
Regarding external validity, one needs to be careful
when generalizing beyond the results of analysis of the two
standards. The differences between the standards may be
limited since the reasons they were selected were the same—
their community, their popularity, and the availability of data
about them.
Regarding internal validity, one needs to be careful
about potential theory, researcher, and selection biases. Our
initial set of criteria to compare standards—obtained at early
stages of research as a result of informal conversations
with stakeholders—guided our entire collection and analysis
processes. We, however, have not forced the opinion data
obtained in interviews and literature survey to match the
initial set of criteria, allowing new criteria to emerge and
old criteria to be refined in our analysis. Our theoretical
background about certification processes, and more specif-
ically about the two certification efforts, could affect the
researcher interpretation during standard document analysis,
data collection, and data analysis. When analyzing standard
documents with fresh eyes—like we do in this study—we
increase the chances of a researcher to perceive differences
across cases, but also increase the potential for misunder-
standings about the studied topic. Even though we have not
observed substantial coding disagreements and have worked
together to settle small ones, one needs to be careful when
generalizing the reliability of coding results since only a pair
of researchers was involved in each transcript analysis.
Our results may be affected by selection bias, since the
opinions from who have not agreed to be interviewed—who
found the matter too sensitive to speak with researchers—
and from who have not written papers about their experi-
ences may have had different opinions and insights about
the certification standards. The distribution of participants is
slightly skewed toward Common Criteria. When analyzing
the distribution of interviewees roles, the distribution is
skewed toward evaluators for Common Criteria and toward
developers for DO-178C. This was not intentional and can be
possibly explained by the availability of public information
about testing laboratories and by our broader personal net-
work of software engineers working on aerospace industry.
The qualitative nature of our analysis and results should only
be mildly affected by this potential bias.
4 CERTIFICATION QUALITY ASPECTS
From our combined analysis of interviews, standard docu-
ments, and literature, we identified seven design dimensions
and ten design qualities that affect certification efforts. The
set of dimensions and qualities as well as their relationships
were derived from the top-level categories of our resulting
coding frame, as explained in Section 3.1. In this study,
design dimensions refer to ranges of alternatives in the design
space from which a designer can explicitly make decisions
about properties of the software products being certified, the
certification processes and the roles vendors and evaluators
played in them, and the standards themselves. Alternatively,
design qualities refer to ranges of outcomes in a design
decision-making process. That is, design qualities can be
interpreted as independent variables of the design process
that uses design dimensions as dependent variables. Table 4
describes the ranges for the found design dimensions.
The final codes in our analysis included both design
dimensions and qualities. We chose to organize and present
our results in terms of the relationships between them, using
design qualities as indexes. Each following sub-section of
the paper discusses a design quality, in which we discuss
the studied standards in context and provide grounded data
about current practices and trends around the identified de-
sign dimensions. Table 5 summarizes the relationship between
the identified dimensions and qualities, where rows represent
design qualities and the columns represent dimensions. The
presence of an or in the table indicate a positive
or negative interaction between them. For example, in a
hypothetical situation where one wants to maximize the
reusability of evidence across product evaluations, explicitly
choosing to increase evaluation frequency can facilitate it.
The indicates that no clear relationship was identified,
and further investigation is necessary. The absence of an
arrow/discussion between a dimensions and a quality does
not imply that an interaction does not exist (neither implies
that it exists), but only that the topic was not identified in our
interviews or literature for the two studied standards. The
following sub-sections contain both nuanced discussions
of the results—which include viewpoints collected from
13 papers and 18 interviews—and our interpretation of the
results. Table 5 intends only to roughly outline the findings—
which is consistent with case study research [44].
After presenting our results, we discuss implications
about the actual development and evolution of certification
efforts and explain how stakeholders could benefit from our
analytical framework in Section 7.
4.1 Validity
Validity, that is, whether evaluations reach a sound assurance
judgment, is of central importance and may depend signifi-
cantly on the formality of evidence available to evaluators,
on how automated the process to evaluate evidence is, and
on how complete the evidence is available for evaluators to
make that judgments.
Formality It is broadly recognized that more formal
evidence and analyses generate more confidence in judge-
ments validity, since it enables direct traceability between
software artifacts and claimed properties [9]. However, in
practice, we found that these are seldom used, even though
they are supported by standards (CC4, DO4). For example,
the documentation of Common Criteria loosely specifies the
form of evidence that developers are supposed to generate,
but it mostly includes many forms of informal evidence
(often produced manually by vendors)1, such as textual
1. As opposed to formal evidence, usually derived from software
artifacts (e.g., proofs generated from proof-carrying code or requirements
coverage obtained from code coverage analysis).
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Design dimensions and their range of options.
Name Description
Formality How formal are the types of
evidence supported by the stan-
dard; ranges from informal
types often produced manually
by developers (e.g., documenta-
tion, informal diagrams) to test-
ing, to more formal and sound
techniques (e.g., proof-carrying
code and proof checkers).
Automation How automated is the process
of producing and evaluating
evidence; ranges from manual
(involving interpretation and
subjective judgments) to fully
automated (being directly ex-
tracted from software artifacts).
Composition How much support to composi-
tion is defined by the standard;
ranges from none, to coarse-
grained (e.g., OS+DB), to fine-
grained (e.g., plugins).
Access to Evidence How much access to evidence
evaluators have; ranges from in-
complete (e.g., sample-based or
black-box testing) to full access
(e.g., source code).
Involvement Style How early in the development
process are evaluators expected
to be involved; ranges from
early pre-development involve-
ment to after-the-fact.
Evaluation
Frequency
How frequent are evaluations
performed; ranges from one-
time-snapshot evaluations to
continuous monitoring where
recertification is performed
more frequently.
Standard Rigidity How much flexibility vendors
and evaluators have in creating
alternatives to meet standard
objectives; ranges from strict
standard compliance to flexible
compliance where they can in-
novate with alternative forms
of evidence.
documentation describing requirements and informal design
and architectural models, but also more formal evidence
such as testing evidence, both test protocols submitted
by developers and independent (black-box) test results
conducted by evaluators (CC1, CC3, CC5). A current trend is
to reduce the expectations toward textual documentation in
favor of testing, decreasing the amount of informal evidence
produced (CC3, CC8), and consequently increasing the
validity of evaluation results. For DO-178C, testing-based
evidence plays a major role in practice [45]. The focus on
testing is to provide evidence for code coverage (DO1, DO2,
[14]) and traceability between source code and requirements
(DO1, DO2, DO3, DO4). The absence of ‘dead code’, obtained
TABLE 5
Design dimensions (columns) and quality aspects (rows) that
affect standards and certification efforts.
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Innovation
either with line or structural coverage, is a highly valued
property to support safety claims of higher criticality soft-
ware products [14]. While testing cannot provide sound
guarantees and should not be used alone in assurance
judgements [9], interviewees stated that it is effective in
revealing issues in products (DO4, DO6, DO8). Formal
methods and model-based approaches, although supported
by the standard, are less common in practice, because they
are expensive to be applied and until recently could not
completely replace testing efforts (DO1, DO2, DO4, [42]).
Interpretation: We found that the use of more informal
evidence, such as documentation and informal design
models, is currently minimized. More formal kinds of
evidence and analyses are available in the standards, but
there is little incentive to use them since they are expensive
to apply. Developers and evaluators seem satisfied with
current testing practices.
Automation Typically, multiple types of evidence are
produced for evaluation reasons and evaluators have to
simultaneously handle all of them to verify how security or
safety requirements are met. We conjecture that automation
can support evaluators in these tasks and increase the validity
of judgements by mitigating the amount of human error
when manually checking multiple evidence. For Common
Criteria, participants state it is typical for evaluators to
verify how good or complete the documentation is (both
documentation on the system’s requirements, structure,
documentation of process aspects) and to independently
test the products’ security functionalities in a black-box
fashion (CC1, CC2, CC4, CC5). The evaluation process is
mainly manual, but one participant highlighted that some
tests can be automated as long as they are not artificially
creating results (CC4). DO-178C interviewees indicated that
evaluators typically witness the execution of tests and check
the traceability between requirements and implementation
in the code (DO4, DO8). The strong traceability requirements
defined in the standard enable the evaluation process to
8be more automated. As DO8 puts it: “the process must be
repeatable and the traceability is an activity that you can redo.”
Interpretation: Our analysis shows that traceability require-
ments facilitate the automation of assurance judgements.
Informal evidence is currently increasingly replaced by
testing efforts in an attempt to reduce manual review effort.
Access to Evidence When evaluating products, eval-
uators need access to evidence to make sound assurance
judgments. We conjecture that access to a more diverse and
complete set of evidence increases the validity of judgments.
For Common Criteria, despite many opposite claims we
heard before this study, multiple participants from the private
sector reported being fairly open with access to source code
and other artifacts (CC1, CC9, CC10). That is, usually, they
provide evaluators with access to any artifact they judge
relevant for the evaluation. For DO-178C, evaluators are seen
in a stronger position than vendors, since, by the mandated
process, they must have access to all evidence produced
by developers (DO3, DO5, DO6, DO7, DO8). As DO5 puts
it: “The certification authority, they’re just in a strong position.
They can say, ‘well, unless you provide the evidence, you won’t
get the certification,’ So, the commercial company will make
reasonable effort to provide the evidence.” In practice, to follow
the mandated process while still protecting their intellectual
property, vendors permit access to source code only in small
samples (DO4, [7]) and at the development site (DO2, DO3,
DO4) or forbid access to source code and make black-box
testing mechanisms based on program inputs and acceptance
criteria available for evaluators.
Interpretation: We observed that security vendors were
more open about access to evidence than aerospace systems
vendors. It is unclear from our study whether partial
evidence shared with evaluators affect their judgements
validity.
4.2 Skill Requirements and Training Costs
The professional background, academic training, and ex-
perience of both developers and evaluators influence the
quality of the evidence produced, the usefulness of evidence
available for judgments, and the thoroughness in which the
evaluation process is conducted [46]. We explored incentives
vendors have to hire developers with specific skills to work
on products and the average profile expected for evaluators
to work on testing laboratories and certification authorities.
This lays a foundation for discussing whether practitioners
are ready to manipulate the types of evidence defined by
standards and how (see Section 4.1).
Our analysis does not show any particular concern about
developers skills beyond current development practices
used in industry. To work with Common Criteria, network
engineering, informatics, computer science, and software
engineering degrees are among the preferred ones for devel-
opers (CC4, CC5, CC9). Security certifications, experience as a
vendor or in “hacking or studying programs” are also highly
valued (CC3, CC4, CC5). In line with Common Criteria’s
original heavy focus on producing informal evidence such
as textual documentation (see Section 4.1), verbal and written
competency as well as endurance were also mentioned as
important skills.
Concerning skills for evaluators, interviewees from both
standards indicate that evaluators usually have from five
to ten years of experience on average, although there is no
experience requirement. Also, they mention that evaluators
often receive training for acclimation to the testing labora-
tories processes, being especially important for newcomers
(DO1, DO3, DO5, DO7, CC3, CC10).
Formality It is known that manipulation of more
formal evidence and analysis requires specific skills or addi-
tional training from developers and evaluators [9]. However,
we found no indication that developers are hired primarily
based on skills that align with a standard. Instead, it is more
common to provide additional training when developers
and evaluators need to develop specific skills to produce
or manipulate evidence. For example, training is provided
to teach DO-178C developers about strict programming
practices that are important to meet safety requirements, such
as deterministic resource consumption and nonexistence
of dead code (DO1, DO7). Model-driven approaches and
simulation are supported by the DO-178 and developers
are usually prepared to use them to reduce testing effort.
However, they often need to teach evaluators about these
approaches and convince them the safety requirements are
sill met (DO4, DO6). Interviewee DO4 stated: “as they are not
part of the industry and not involved in any development, it’s very
difficult to keep on the track of the industry.”
Interpretation: We found no concerns about hiring de-
velopers or evaluators with specific skills for the current
state of the studied certification standards. The formality of
testing mechanisms, currently the most common assurance
mechanism used in certification, does not require specific
skills from practitioners.
4.3 Reliability
When standards allow assurance judgments to have a
subjective component, it is important to assure that multiple
evaluators reach consistent judgments, especially when
they are competing on a market (see also Section 4.9).
Inter-evaluator reliability especially becomes an issue when
scaling the evaluation process to provide assurance for
many products in a market that cannot be assessed by a
single testing laboratory. The failure to achieve reliability
might lead vendors to seek evaluators that facilitate the
evaluation process but compromise its quality. We explored
how evaluators, whether from different laboratories or
countries, assure that they reach the same outcome for a
particular evaluation.
Despite much effort, Common Criteria seems to struggle
to achieve reliability among the different private testing
laboratories, as indicated by interviewees that acknowledge
observable differences between practices in the U.S and
Europe (CC4, CC6, [39]) The standard is explicitly designed
for mutual recognition of certification results, replacing the
quest for mutual recognition of product evaluations ended
in 1998 [39]. Hearn [5] mentions international harmonization
and national investments as the main barriers for compa-
rability of evaluations. In fact, some of our interviewees
criticized the mutual recognition scheme as not functional
(CC4, CC8) and infeasible for political and economic reasons
9(CC2). It is specially difficult to reach consistency with high-
complexity systems and EAL-based evaluations (CC2, CC4,
CC7, CC8), indicating a lot of variance in the judgments made
by evaluators (CC2). Not even the oversight structure defined
by the certification scheme (described in Section 2.1) solves
the problem. As CC2 states: “Vendors may give an argument, it
may be wrong, but if you don’t have the design evidence to back up
the argument then from an oversight perspective they look the same.
You know the arguments are fine where one may be protecting the
information and the other may not.” For DO-178C, interviewees
paint a much more positive picture of inter-rater reliability.
One interviewee reports perceiving evaluators from different
countries “as doing the same things” (DO3), as a consequence
of the explicit effort of testing laboratories, both from private
companies and from public agencies, across the world to be
more consistent.
Access to Evidence We conjecture that by having
access implementation artifacts, evaluators can eliminate
the potential imprecision that emerge from the level of
indirection and subjectivity present in informal evidence,
potentially increasing reliability among assurance judgments.
From the interviews, we observed that the use of
implementation artifacts depends directly on the experience
of evaluators (CC2, CC3, CC5, CC9, CC10), but most of them
prefer not to use implementation artifacts in their judgements.
CC8 explains: “Source code is not providing – source code review
does not provide us an adequate return on investment for the risk
associated”. CC8 continues: “We decided that review of source
code was risky to vendors, was time-consuming and expensive to
evaluation facilities, and it really did not give us the confidence
that we needed because we had no sense of consistency”. In an
effort to improve reliability among evaluators, Protection
Profiles—and the test baselines defined by them—are
becoming more common for evaluations (CC2, CC4, CC8).
CC8 explains: “We really had to kind of come to a place
where we looked at really kind of crystallizing what exact test
activities did we want conducted as part of these evaluations.”
Interpretation: We observed that the direct manipulation
or review of source code and other implementation arti-
facts are sometimes avoided to increase reliability among
evaluators, aiming to reduce the amount of what are
considered time-consuming and expensive activities to
testing laboratories.
Standard Rigidity We argue that by being more
specific about how evaluation activities should be conducted
and by investing in harmonization practices, certification
efforts can achieve higher reliability. For DO-178C practi-
tioners, the use of implementation artifacts does not seem
to be an issue, since they feel safety properties can be
more objectively assessed in the source code (e.g. in terms
of code coverage) (DO4, DO7). In addition, participants
mentioned many strategies that are used to promote common
understanding between evaluators: policies and position
papers that define the use of specific technologies, face-to-
face meetings and workshops every year among evaluators
from different countries, and continuous training are used
to ensure everyone has the required competency to perform
evaluations (DO4, DO5, DO7).
Interpretation: We found that specifying more objectively
in the standard how implementation artifacts should
be used in an evaluation and consistently promoting
harmonization among evaluators have positive effects on
reliability.
4.4 Timely Certification
Interviewees of the two standards had different views on
the urgency of releasing products and on whether the
evaluation process duration is an issue, with Common
Criteria developers much more concerned about timely
certification than DO-178C stakeholders.
Involvement . We conjecture that an early involvement
of evaluators in the certification process can increase the
chance of developing products that are already compliant to
a standard, and consequently, reduce certification time.
For DO-178C, the evaluation time is aligned with the
time required to develop complex aviation products, such
as airplanes or satellites. The development can take years,
usually from three to five depending on their complexity
(DO6, DO7), giving vendors enough time to think and plan
the evaluation of their products. Because vendors of aviation
products do not have a choice of whether to certify their
products or not, evaluators are involved in the development
and certification from the beginning2 and vendors know
that they cannot rush a product to the market. In contrast,
Common Criteria vendors often have finished products, and
sometimes sales pending on a certificate, which sometimes
gives little flexibility for vendors to re-engineer their products
and for evaluators to suggest security fixes at the design
level. When vendors have sales pending on a certificate, the
average one-year evaluation cycle is less attractive (CC3,
CC6).
Interpretation: We found that the phase in which evalu-
ators are involved in the development and certification
of products generate different expectations around time
for evaluation. The less overlap between the development
and the certification of a product, the higher are vendors’
expectations toward more expedite evaluations.
Automation We argue that automation can support
certification efforts in reducing the average time to evaluate
products. DO-178C certifications can take longer than usual
at higher levels of assurance (DO3, DO4, DO6). This is driven
largely by the coverage requirements of the standard (DO2,
DO5, DO4), which can be reduced with existent specialized tooling
to automate traceability checks [47]. While the safety community
that builds aerospace products seem to be more stable
regarding the automation of their processes, the security
community seeks constant revisions of their standard to
increase the use of regression testing in the evaluation process
rather than relying on manual documentation review to
enable a more expedite evaluation process.
Interpretation: We found that tools play an important role
in automation when certification processes are more stable.
Formality We conjecture that informal evidence tend to
require more interpretation from evaluators, which can delay
2. Stages of Involvement audits (SOIs) are expected throughout the
software life cycle of a project [28].
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the evaluation of products. In fact, among causes for long
evaluation cycles observed in Common Criteria certifications,
interviewees report reviewing issues and fixing non-conformities
in evidence submitted to evaluation. For example, it is known
that it is difficult to keep security documentation aligned
with complex evolving systems requirements and design
[13]. One goal behind the recent push toward Protection
Profiles in Common Criteria is to reduce certification time
from years to months by replacing the extensive amount of
documentation required by domain-specific test requirements
(CC4, CC8). A policymaker, CC8, characterized this in our
interview as “we need to do test activities that are going to give
vendors a good return on investment.”
Interpretation: We observed a trend indicating a reduction
in the amount of informal evidence produced during
evaluations, aiming at reducing the average evaluation
time.
4.5 Certification Risks and Evaluation Independence
When defining standards and certification processes around
them, a key design decision is in when to involve evaluators
in the design and development process, which can directly
affect the risks and independence aspects of evaluations.
There is a range of possibilities, from assessing already early
designs to assessing only the finished product after the fact.
Involvement We argue that early involvement can
have far greater influence in the success of a certification.
For example, evaluators can encourage best practices, good
designs, and modern tooling, rather than reverse engineer
final products. At the same time, it can harm the evaluation
independence aspects of certification efforts. The Common
Criteria standard documents specify that final certifications
happen after the fact, but that some portion of the evaluation
or preliminary evaluations can occur already during design
and development. In practice, in most cases, the evaluation
is conducted after the fact, often when the vendor learns that
certification is required to sell on specific markets. At that
point, evaluators have none or little leverage to influence in a
product’s design. The evaluators job is then performing after-
the-fact gap analysis to find non-conformances between the
specification and implementation of the products (CC3, CC4,
CC5, [40]) and even producing evidence on vendors’ behalf
(CC3, CC4). CC3 explains: “The way I like to put it is product
vendors are in the business of making product. They’re not in the
business of writing certification documents. So, as part of Common
Criteria there are still some consultancy aspects.” However, there
are exceptions and sometimes testing laboratories are able to
provide informal guidance to vendors about how to achieve
the security requirements before or while the product is
developed (CC5), specially for high-budget projects. One of
the interviewed evaluators explained that especially “mature
vendors”, who have experience with prior evaluations, start
working with certification in mind starting very early in the
development process (CC4), reducing certification re-work
costs and risks. For DO-178C, interviewees confirmed what
the standard only vaguely expects: audits and physical visits
by evaluators are common starting early in the development
of products (DO3, DO4, DO5, DO6, DO7). The frequency
of audits increases as the criticality of products increases,
with an average of three physical visits per year (DO6);
High-criticality products receive the most attention from
evaluators (DO4, DO5). Interviewee DO5 explains: “When
we have a project that we really want to be successful, then we
get involved very early in the project and look very carefully at
the early stage, having the requirements and design reviewed, test
readiness reports, review boards, qualification, and all that at great
level of detail.”
Interpretation: We found that DO-178C regulations and
policies require evaluators to be involved early in the
development of products. For Common Criteria, however,
it is often the case that vendors are not mature enough or
are not aware of Common Criteria until they need to sell
their products, which increases certification risks.
4.6 Costs with Suppliers
Another sore topic in our interviews was the costs involved
in reusing of libraries, frameworks, and other artifacts from
third-parties. A common strategy used in any software
development, which includes certified products, is to reuse
artifacts to reduce development time and cost. The support
for composition mechanisms by certification standards is
frequently discussed among practitioners and policymakers.
Composition It is well-accepted that reusing com-
posable artifacts can reduce development time and cost.
In certification, however, fine-grained composition actually
increase costs and negotiation overhead with suppliers.
Although challenging, the composition of functionality is
common in practice and supported by both standards at a
coarse level of granularity—e.g., composition of application
software with a certified database system and a certified
operating system (CC2, CC5, DO7, CC6, [43]). As CC5 puts
it: “the developer is required to make a statement of compatibility
and from it can be pretty much understood how the two products
are connected, what functionalities the composite product uses
from the platform.” In practice, composite evaluations have an
expiration date to force periodic reevaluation of interactions
among products (CC5). Fine-grained composition with third-
party dependencies (libraries, services), though, is seriously
challenging. The use of external dependencies is influenced
by the size and the criticality of the products to be certified.
High assurance components tend do avoid dependencies
(CC1, DO1, DO2), whereas dependencies are more common
in small and low-assurance products where they are not
certified (CC1, DO2). DO2 exemplifies that the entertainment
system in an airplane may use an uncertified streaming
library. If a commercial component should be reused, a
vendor can request safety or security evidence from the third-
party supplier, often at a premium (DO3). If that component
is not already certified, the vendor may need to provide
own evidence for that component as well, increasing the
cost of certification (DO7). In these cases, commonly is
some negotiation between vendor and supplier, in which
usually vendors end up paying suppliers for the costs of
certifying their products (DO3). In other cases, for example,
when vendors need to use certified libraries (e.g., math or
logging), the library can be used after it has been modeled
and simulated in a model-based development environment
(DO2, [41]), such as SCADE [48].
For Common Criteria, policy-makers have an increased
interest in having mechanisms to support fine-grained
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composition (CC8), for example, to enable a certified crypto
module to be integrated into a larger product, such as
a browser. There is already a synergy between FIPS 140
(a cryptography standard) and some Protection Profiles
that support this kind of composition. However, there
is still a lack of compositional assurance mechanisms to
reduce the reliance on vendors to follow effective security
engineering principles when composing commercial off-the-
shelf products [12], [5], [13]. Current mechanisms are limited
to testing known interactions between products (CC2, CC5,
CC6, CC7, CC8).
Interpretation: We observed that support for platforms,
ecosystems, and app markets, where an end user may
compose (possibly certified) artifacts from different sources
are not in scope of either certification standard and are
considered incompatible with current assurance techniques
based on testing.
4.7 Reusability of Evidence
A common concern in our interviews were issues regarding
the maintenance of certified products over time, from small
incremental changes to larger changes between releases.
Both standards have provisions for recertification, expecting
developers and evaluators to perform an impact analysis,
which includes adequately documenting the changes in the
product being maintained.
The degree of reuse of evidence is a result of negotiation
between vendors and evaluators and it usually involves
arguments about the extent of the changes and the time passed
since the product was evaluated. Again, trust between vendors
and evaluators plays an important role (see also Section 4.9).
For minor changes in certified products, participants re-
port “reusing as much evidence as possible” (CC1, DO3, CC9,
CC10). Previously unmodified parts of the product are not
reevaluated (DO4, DO5, CC5, DO7) and regression tests play
an important role supporting the identification of artifacts
impacted by changes (DO1, CC4, CC7). For major changes, a
complete recertification is expected with each release (CC1,
CC6, CC7). In Common Criteria, significant changes in
a Protection Profile can require a complete recertification.
However, grace periods exists with which a certification
can be maintained despite smaller changes: “products can
be maintained for two years before they have to be re-evaluated”
(CC4). However, the situation is, at least, alarming when
vulnerabilities are found in certified security products: “If
your product uses an affected version of OpenSSL and it has
already been certified or validated, you are not required to recertify
it” [49]. Beyond the reuse of concrete evidence, the reuse of
knowledge across evaluations emerged as a common topic in
our interviews.
Evaluation Frequency We conjecture that by push-
ing evaluation frequency to what would be a continu-
ous evaluation processes, rather than a one-time discrete
one, could minimize the differences between versions of
a certified product and potentially increase the reuse of
evidence. Although provisions for recertification exists in
both standards, practitioners still complain about the costs
and duration of recertification (CC6, CC8, DO7, [12]). For
example, certification is considered to have minimal value
if the evaluation process takes more time than product life
cycle. The current certification practices are incompatible
with frequent releases that are increasingly adopted with the
DevOps movement in large parts of the software industry.
CC7 explains: “(rapid recertification) is going to matter even
more because everything is going faster. My favorite example is
containers. If you’re doing containers correctly, you’re talking
about doing a build daily or even hourly in some cases”.
Interpretation: We found that vendors are concerned about
one-time-snapshot certifications, which usually take a long
time and provide little flexibility to products evolution.
Consequently, we expect one-time-snapshot certifications
to be prohibitive in scenarios that expect frequent product
releases or major changes in products overtime.
4.8 Return on Investment
With certification processes being perceived as costly and
slow, there is a question whether the perceived benefits justify
the costs—whether certification has a positive return on in-
vestment. The literature reported that vendors do not believe
that certification improves the quality of evaluated products
or processes [5], [13], [10], [24]. Some of our interviewees
report hearing the same complaints from vendors (CC3, CC6).
At the same time, interviewees actually often have something
positive to say about certification. For example, as direct
benefits participants mentioned an increased understanding
of the products by developers (CC1, DO1) and a noticeable
quality improvement of evaluated products (CC3, CC6, CC7).
Formality We conjecture that more formal evidence
would be considerably more expensive to produce and
not provide good return on investment. However, DO-
178C interviewees explained a positive feedback cycle in
which certification costs pushed developers toward increased
use of model-based approaches to verifying requirements
before implementation, which also reduced rework of issues
propagated to code and tests (DO3, DO4). There is also
an incentive for developers to adopt such approaches to
reduce testing efforts, though evaluators are not necessarily
technically prepared to evaluate products using this kind of
technology (see Section 4.2).
Interpretation: We found that some types of more formal
evidence, such as models that can be simulated, can
enable greater return on investment for vendors. However,
evaluators are not necessarily technically apt to use them.
Automation By increasing the repeatability of pro-
cesses and reducing development and evaluation costs, we
conjecture automation can enable greater return on invest-
ment. For Common Criteria, some interviewees reported a
significant value from the evaluation process, since test suites
were expanded to satisfy more rigorous testing requirements
[40] and many bugs were fixed during regression testing
activities. (CC6, CC7). For example, CC6 mentioned how
the Linux random number generator benefited greatly from
going through certification and being extensively tested and
reviewed in the evaluation process.
Interpretation: We found that increased repeatability, even
if not using formal evidence, can enable greater return on
investment for both vendors and evaluators that can re-run
tests across different versions of certified products.
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4.9 Trust Issues
Access to intellectual property (e.g., details of a proprietary
encryption algorithm embedded in a security product), can
cause real trust issues between vendors and evaluators in
the certification process.
Access to Evidence We argue that requiring vendors
to share more evidence, specially implementation artifacts,
can generate trust issues between vendors and evaluators.
For example, vendors might fear leakage of proprietary in-
formation to competitors by evaluators. However, we found
that vendors can be fairly open about access to intellectual
property or use other mechanisms to protect it, as discussed
in Section 4.1. Also, evaluators often prefer not to use
implementation artifacts (see Section 4.3, which potentially
minimizes trust issues. One participant mentioned the use
of implementation artifacts to protect testing laboratories
from liabilities. CC5 explain: “we keep a copy of vendors’
encrypted source code to protect us in case of court disputes.” Most
interviewees emphasize the importance of a trust relationship
between vendors and evaluators that forms over time.
Interpretation: We observed that vendors tend to be open
about implementation artifacts, but can rely on protection
mechanisms when trust has not been developed between
vendors and evaluators and there are concerns about
leakages of intellectual property.
4.10 Innovation
Innovation plays an important role in certification efforts,
since software represents both the means and end of
certification. Software systems are frequently evolving or
being replaced by more modern versions that contain new
technology. Hence, it is expected that standards, process, and
tools also evolve to correspond to systems being developed.
There is also an interesting synergy between innovation
and skills requirements. Developers and evaluators are
resistant to change their practices, which can be an obstacle
in evolving the standard (DO2, DO4, DO7). As discussed
in Section 4.2, DO-178C evaluators often have to be taught
about more formal evidence and convinced by developers
that the same safety guarantees hold with them. This limits
the adoption of formal methods, model-driven approaches,
and simulation in practice, since they expect specific technical
skills from evaluators.
Standard Rigidity We conjecture that the lack of
flexibility in a standard can hinder innovation and lead to
its obsolescence (CC1, [13]). In the past, “federal agencies have
abandoned monolithic standards, because they lacked flexibility and
led to expensive and complex acquisitions. Standards can prevent
the use of highly desirable but nonconforming technologies and
COTS products [13].” Interviewee CC6 warns: “I think that
is the danger is that the certification efforts don’t keep up with
technology everyone’s gonna get waivers and no one’s gonna care”.
In an attempt to mitigate this issue, standard revisions and
policies are released to ensure that the latest technology gets
out to end customers (CC8, DO7).
Interpretation: We found that technology adoption is slow
and that evaluators have no or little incentive to maintain
consistency with technology used by vendors.
5 RELATED WORK
Relevant work about certification standards is incorporated
into our literature survey (see Section 3.4), discussed as part
of our results (see Section 4), and summarized in this section.
The literature underpinning our research design is described
in sections 3 and 5.5.
5.1 Discussion of Common Criteria
Several authors have critiqued Common Criteria since its
conception, which provides context to why it has been and
still is revised. Hearn [5] puts Common Criteria in question,
sharing the pessimistic opinions of buyers and sellers about
the perceived benefits of the Common Criteria certification.
He suggests improvements around composition and pre-
development certification to better address vendors’ needs
and to enable products to be re-engineered if necessary.
Keblawi and Sullivan [13] provide an interesting perspective
of Common Criteria being applied to aircraft traffic control
systems. The paper also identifies a need for better security
requirements at the system level, including composition of
certified products. Lipner has long been involved in the
community of security standards in the United States [12],
[39], [24]. More recently, Lipner [24] presents an overview
of the story of Common Criteria (and the old Orange Book),
providing context for still current issues and aspirations for
Common Criteria certification. For example, he highlighted
the difficulty in achieving reliability among evaluations and
frequently observed misalignment between documentation
and actual product implementation. As examples of pa-
pers about Common Criteria that we excluded from the
literature survey, we mention the work from Barabanov et
al. [54], Kaluvuri et al. [56], and Kang et al. [55], which
discuss Common Criteria being applied by a different
scheme/country and technical aspects around the evaluation
of Smart TVs and Web Services, respectively. In addition,
Shankar et al. [40] report their experience in evaluating
Linux using Common Criteria. The paper mentions both
challenges and positives aspects in conducting this process
in open source. The frequent mismatches between code
and design documentation is a barrier, but source code
availability and promptness of the community in face of
new vulnerabilities make evaluations of operating systems
easier than in commercial settings.
5.2 Discussion of DO-178C
Stakeholders in the aerospace domain seem much more
confident in the DO-178C, but still often critique aspects of
the standard, such as the exaggerated focus on hardware-
level assurance, the subjectivity in certification audits, and
the lack of automation in specific areas of the process. In
particular, Thomas [6] reacts to a National Research Council
report and calls attention to the infeasibility to provide
the same level of assurance for software systems as it is
usually done with hardware. He suggests improvements
for DO-178C in three areas: requiring explicit claims about
software properties, providing evidence to support claims
at a practical and useful level (as also mentioned by Rushby
[14]), and determining specific expertise to help develop-
ers/vendors in creating useful evidence for claims. Dodd
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et al. [7] discusses a set of issues regarding certification
audits of airborne software, which includes subjectivity
in certification processes and lack of predictability of the
certification process. To mitigate these issues, they propose
an statistical method for supporting certification audits
based on continuous data analysis of projects’ lifecycle to
trace potential deviations overtime. Moy et al. [42] report
their successful experience using formal methods to replace
testing efforts in a production-like environment at Dassault-
Aviation and Airbus, showing that it can be practical and
faster with the support of more automated tools. More
recently, Hatcliff and colleagues [43] identified current socio-
technical challenges in developing and certifying safety-
critical software-systems, after revisiting topics discussed
earlier by Heimdahl [41]. New challenges are mentioned, but
old challenges, such as requirements validity, composition,
role of tools in certification, automation, and training for
developers (often not prepared to produce safety evidence)
are still pain points for certification. We also found other
works that discuss DO-178C, but are mostly descriptive
and focus on technical details. Gigante and Pascarella [57]
and Ulrich and Allen [58] are explain formal methods and
verification techniques would fit the DO-178C certification
process life-cycle, respectively. Hilderman [59] describes the
major costs and benefits from DO-178C certification.
5.3 Other Certification Standards
As mentioned in Section 2, there are many certification efforts
besides the two investigated in this paper, which includes
NIST RMF 800 Series [20] for information security, IEC 62304
[19] for software medical devices, IEC 60880 [60] for nuclear
software systems, IEC 15504 [61] for software processes, IEC
25000 [62] for software products functional quality, and many
others defined by organizations such as ISO/IEC. Rodriguez
et al. [64], [65] report their experience in using IEC 25000
to evaluate the functional suitability of a web application
for managing human resources in two opportunities: after
and before some functional changes. The results shows a
consistent level of compliance between functional elements
evaluated and number of product requirements implemented.
These standards could also be compared using a similar
process and the same initial set of criteria we used to compare
Common Criteria and DO-178C (see Table 1), but the
investigation of these standards are not in the scope of this
paper.
5.4 Standards Comparison
There are also papers that perform standards comparison,
but much more focused and fine-grained. Lahtinen et al.
compared both IEC 60880 and IEC 61508 standards, aiming
at identifying differences in strictness and scope between
the “shall” requirements as defined by the two standards.
The results indicate that such fine-grained comparison is
difficult, but they could still identify that even though the two
standards are fairly similar, they complement each other and
should be used together to achieve higher safety assurance.
Hawkins et al. [63] investigated differences in certifying a
wheel braking system when using a prescriptive approach
(DO-178C) and when using assurance cases. The authors
suggest linking assurance cases and DO-178C processes
to increase safety assurance, since using assurance cases
alone might be challenging, especially for vendors without
experience in developing cases. Our study complements
these papers by contrasting two distinct standards, which
contributes to a broader discussion about certification efforts
across communities. We are not aware of any other papers
that compare standards across communities, focusing on
contrasting cases to confront community-specific culture.
5.5 Design Spaces
Design spaces have been widely studied by the design
community, where exploring alternatives more systematically
is considered good practice [30], [66], [67]. Designers are often
described as explorers that use their abilities to assess design
options and make informed decisions based on the trade-
offs that these options entail. With our study, we attempt
to provide an initial contribution to building a design space
for software certification standards, so that stakeholders can
also make informed decisions when creating or updating
standards, empowering them to reason more systematically
about the options in the space, similar to how many other
areas have done in the past with architectural styles [68],
computer input devices [69], [70], wireless communication
[71], 3D architectures [72], and self-adaptive systems [73].
6 REASONING ABOUT CERTIFICATION EFFORTS
DESIGN
Our grounded analysis of both literature and interviews with
stakeholders in two certification standards can provide initial
unbiased guidance to stakeholders, including practitioners,
testing laboratories, policymakers, academics, government
agencies, or anyone in a position to influence decisions about
certification standards and processes, regarding the many
complex choices and implications involved in designing
certification efforts.
As already discussed in Section 4, our paper does not
propose to generate a complete bounded set of design
dimensions and qualities that affect certification efforts,
but to contribute the foundation toward a theory that can
explain the relationships between them. In this specific case,
a resulting theory should resemble the contents of Table 5,
which describes positive and negative interactions between
design dimensions and qualities.
Even in its initial development stage, we argue a theory
like this can be useful to support reasoning of the design
decisions that can influence the result of certification efforts.
The following outlined steps (and the hypothetical scenario
described) exemplify how one could use a theory in concrete
scenarios while creating or revising a certification standard:
1) select a quality of interest;
If a member of certification standard committee decides
vendors (developers) should have freedom to innovate with
new tools and assurance techniques (for example, to ensure
that compliance processes do not become obsolete), they would
go to Table 5 and lookup the Innovation quality row;
2) check which dimensions affect it;
Then, our results would indicate a relationship between
Innovation and Standard Rigidity. In this case, in order
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to increase the opportunity for innovation, they would have
to make the standard more flexible in terms of compliance
processes, tools, or technology;
3) for each dimension that affects the selected quality
(selected in step 1), reason about how other qualities are
affected;
In our scenario, the results would indicate that adjusting
Standard Rigidity (for example, by making a standard
more flexible) could indirectly lead to negative implications
on Reliability. By knowing the consequences of making a
certification standard less or more rigid, one can reason about
solutions that minimize reliability issues while maintaining
the standard evolving along new technological trends.
The outlined steps (and the hypothetical scenario de-
scribed) shows how a theory—even in its early stages of
development—can be used to reason about the trade-offs
involved in designing certification. While simplistic, the
described scenario highlights the potential of the theory
to highlight direct and indirect relationships between design
dimensions and qualities. Finally, we call for attention
that stakeholders should not only use the summarized
results in Table 5 to make decisions, but also consider text
containing the nuanced discussions of the results and decide
for themselves, considering the context they are inserted,
whether the theory applies.
7 CONCLUSION
As our results shows, we have identified many dimensions
and qualities that can affect the design of certification efforts.
The options available in each design dimension have distinct
implications and can directly influence the technical, social,
and economic qualities of certification. More investigation
is necessary to elicit other relevant design dimensions,
disambiguate relationships between them, and confront our
preliminary results. However, our grounded analysis of both
literature and interviews with stakeholders in two certifica-
tion standards can provide initial guidance to stakeholders
about the many complex choices and consequences involved
in designing certification efforts.
Implications. More generally, observations about one par-
ticular standard can be used by stakeholders in another
standard to rethink about their own certification processes,
techniques, and practices. Also, observations from indi-
viduals that play one particular role in the certification
process can provide a distinct perspective to stakeholders in
different roles, increasing their awareness about issues and
enabling them to think about alternative incentives to address
potential issues in their certification processes. Specifically,
(1) developers and vendors of one particular standard can
now have a distinct perspective of techniques used in
another standard, which enables them to reason about the
applicability of the techniques in their context and about
how it could affect their certification processes and results
quality (e.g., DO-178C requirements/code coverage could
be practical for Common Criteria vendors to mitigate the
subjectivity in their source code evaluation), (2) evaluators
and meta-evaluators can now understand how developers
and vendors in a different domain react to standard com-
pliance requirements and what are their practices when
producing evidence, which can enable evaluators to develop
policies that can refine standards to prevent misuses or
abuses of techniques to evade these compliance requirements,
(3) policy-makers can directly use our results to understand
trade-offs in certification and make decisions that affect
emergent certification initiatives for IoT ecosystems, self-
driving cars, wearable medical devices, and others.
New standards for self-driving cars, for example, are
still being discussed. The U.S. Department of Transportation
recently released guidelines to self-driving cars and high-
lighted the importance “to offer solutions that the industry
can implement” [8]. The same document describes their
expectations toward software updates: “manufacturers will
likely provide software updates for motor vehicles well after they
are manufactured and certified.”, suggesting the need for fast
and automated re-certification. Our results show that the
studied standards are not ready to address this need, since
cars often have a significant shorter development cycle when
compared to airplanes and re-certification procedures still
heavily rely on manual change impact analysis techniques.
We hope that our analytical framework can provide a starting
point into such a discussion and collaborate with initiatives
of certifying software systems across recent domains such as
IoT ecosystems, self-driving cars, wearable medical devices,
and others constantly arising in our society.
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